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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 Kang (2002) concluded that corruption, as felt and perceived in the Philippines and Korea, 
shares similar facets. The Philippines and Korea had the same corruption level in the 1960’s, the 
former during the Marcos era while the latter with Park Chung-hee’s administration. However, 
compared to Korea, the Philippines has yet to make any significant progress in its fight against 
corruption. This study is an attempt to determine the best practices of the Korea’s Anti-
Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) in fighting corruption that can be applied by 
the Philippine Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) by doing a comparative analysis of the anti-
corruption strategies of both institutions. Results showed that ACRC lacks the prosecutorial 
powers that OMB has. Even so, ACRC is able to impose concrete prevention and deterrence 
measures by: reducing government size and regulation; using e-People interactive system that 
provides for easy detection of corruption behavior of government officials; and adopting a 
whistleblowing protection system that encourages informants. In these areas, the OMB has much 
to learn. It must rethink and must aggressively exercise its influence and power in improving its 
anti-corruption mechanism. It can start from strongly pushing for the adoption of the proposed 
whistleblowing bill, actively engaging different civic groups in its anti-corruption campaigns, 
and demonstrating strong political will in combating corruption. It is also important that OMB 
must identify the priority areas in its fight against corruption. Unless these points are given 
serious consideration, corruption is and will always get in the way of getting things done for the 
Philippines. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
I. Statement of the problem  
 
The last nine months of 2009 proved to be a tumultuous time for both the Philippines and 
the Republic of South Korea (Korea hereafter) in their struggle against corruption. During this 
year, former President Roh Moo-hyun committed suicide amidst allegations of a $6-million 
bribery case filed against him. Meanwhile, incumbent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had faced 
severe criticisms from media, rival politicians, and civil society groups over several allegations 
of corruption involving herself and her immediate family. Suspected bribery cases against a 
number of Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency 
(PDEA) agents, the ZTE-NBN broadband project scam, and the alleged rigged bidding on World 
Bank highway projects are just some of the issues of corruption that had surfaced this year (Pulse 
Asia, 2009). These instances underscore how two countries of different economic capacities 
struggle against a common problem of corruption.   
 
As one speaker from the 2009 APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Symposium 
bluntly stated, “no country is totally exempt from the problem of corruption, whether developed 
or not.” However, corruption is particularly destructive among developing countries like the 
Philippines. As Kang (2002a) had put it, “the Philippines has a public image of cronyism, 
corruption, and bad government retarding its development” (p.2). Although, there is no official 
figure reported estimating the amount of government’s loss due to corruption, there are some 
rough estimates given (Romero, n.d.). As reported by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB 
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hereafter), about US$48 billion of the government’s funds had been robbed for the last twenty 
years due to corruption. Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit’s reported that the money lost is 
pegged at approximately US$44.5 million every year. Notably, the World Bank estimated that 
around 20% of the yearly government budget goes to corruption.   
 
Kang (2002a) concluded that corruption, as felt and perceived in the Philippines and 
Korea, shares similar facets. In both countries there exists “money politics” which helps in 
understanding the dynamics of their political affairs. According to him, the Philippines and 
Korea were characterized by the prevalence of corruption, the former during the Marcos era 
while the latter during Park Chung-hee’s administration. Kang also theorized that “political, not 
economic, considerations dominated policy making in both countries” (p.3). This implies that 
policy decisions are not made based on efficiency criterion but on that which serves the self-
interests of the country’s political actors and business sector. This conclusion is in stark contrast 
to the findings of other Korean scholars such as Yoo and Lee (1987) and Shin, et. al. (2002). 
They see eye to eye on claiming that the government had the upper-hand over corporate actors 
during Park Chung Hee administration pursuing economic development among others.  
 
 However, compared to Korea, the Philippines has yet to make any significant progress in 
its fight against corruption as reflected by its Corruption Perception Index (CPI hereafter) for the 
last thirteen years as shown below. As designed by the Transparency International, “CPI ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials 
and politicians” (Transparency International, 2008, par.25). It is a “composite index” that uses 
the scale of 0 to 10. Corruption is very high in the Philippines as evidenced by its low CPI 
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(Transparency International, 2008). For the last ten years since 2000, Philippines has been 
receiving CPI lower than 3, which clearly shows a grim reality of the general perception of 
corruption in the country.  
Year  No. of 
Countries 
Surveyed  
 
The Philippines  
 
Korea  
  Rank  Score Rank Score 
1997 52 40 3.05 34 4.29 
1998 85 55 3.3 43 4.2 
1999 99 54 3.6 50 3.8 
2000 90 69 2.8 48 4 
2001 91 65 2.9 42 4.2 
2002 102   77 2.6 40 4.5 
2003 133 92 2.5 50 4.3 
2004 148 102 2.6 47 4.5 
2005 158 117 2.5 40 5 
2006 163 121 2.5 42 5.1 
2007 180 131 2.5 43 5.1 
2008 180 141 2.3 40 5.6 
2009 180 139 2.4 39 5.5 
Table 1. CPIs of Korea and the Philippines for the last 13 years. (Transparency International. Surveys 
and Indices, n.d.) 
 
 
  This finding supports the World Bank report on its yearly Control of Corruption Index 
(CoCI hereafter) survey whereby, the Philippines, from 76th percentile in 2006 to 57th percentile 
in 2007, recorded a failing score of 47th percentile in 2008. Hence, out of the 206 countries that 
were surveyed, the country was ranked 47th on control of corruption. CoCI is the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests” (Governance Matters, 2009, par. 8).  
The higher the percentile rank, the better control of corruption is in the country. While the 
Philippines had been given a passing rate until last year, it was recently concluded that the 
country’s control over corruption has been very insubstantial (Herrling, 2008). Meanwhile, 
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compared to the Philippines, Korea’s CCI scores had been consistently encouraging for the last 
ten years, never falling below 50th percentile (Kaufmann, et. al, 2009). 
  
Similar off-putting results were published in November 2008 by The Asian Foundation 
(TAF) and the Social Weather Station (SWS) in its Annual Enterprise Survey on Corruption as 
follows (Johnson, 2008, par. 5):  
 
• “71% of the businesses were asked last year (1997) for a bribe for a government 
transaction;  
• 20% of a contract is allotted as a bribe for public sector contracts in Metro Manila;  
• The perception of government agencies’ sincerity in fighting or preventing public 
sector corruption has stagnated or worsened” [most are anti-corruption agencies].  
 
Meanwhile, according to the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd. for the year 
2009, the situation has improved for the country from being the previous year’s rock bottom. It 
scored 7 in a grading scale of 0 to 10, with ten being the most corrupt Asian country (Perth Now 
Singapore Correspondents, 2009). But given new allegations of corruption against the incumbent 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, it could be expected that the country’s ranking this year will 
not improve, if not reach a new low.  
 
Amidst such daunting reports, the OMB, the Philippines’ top graft-buster, is always at the 
receiving end of heavy criticisms coming from different sectors of society. The OMB is the 
legally mandated institution in charge of preventing, investigating, and prosecuting graft and 
corruption cases against public elective and appointed officials.  
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Over the years, Korea’s level of corruption has been significantly lower than that of the 
Philippines. In light of this, the researcher wants to know what has been the role of the Anti-
Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC hereafter), particularly, the anti-corruption 
initiatives that it employs, in fighting corruption in Korea. What can the Philippines’ OMB learn 
from the ACRC’s fight against graft and corruption in Korea? How can the ACRC anti-
corruption strategies and methodologies be applied by the OMB in its similar crusade? 
Specifically, the researcher seeks to find Korea’s best practices in combating corruption that can 
be adopted in the Philippines to better address the problem. 
 
To achieve the purpose and objectives of this study, the researcher conducted a 
comparative analysis between the experiences of Korea’s ACRC and the Philippines’ OMB in 
curbing corrupt activities of government employees in their respective countries.   
  
 The Philippines and Korea bear several similarities that led researcher to conclude that 
comparative study of both countries is not a far-fetched idea. For one, both countries had 
suffered similar economic difficulties during the 50’s and 60’s. Another similarity revolves 
around the fact that Korea and the Philippines were both ruled by colonial powers prior to World 
War II, the latter by the Spanish while the former by the Imperial Japan. Thereafter, the United 
States of America (US hereafter) played an important role in both countries in the cold war times 
(You, 2005). Both had undergone dictatorship and also been struggling to achieve full 
democracy since 1980s (Kim, 2003 ).  
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II. Objectives of the Study  
General Objective:  
 The general objective of this study is to analyze the anti-corruption mechanisms, 
strategies, policies, and methodologies of the ACRC, Korea’s top graft-buster, in order to 
determine the best practices that can be applied by the OMB in combating corruption in the 
Philippines.  
 
Specific Objectives:  
The specific objectives of the study are the following:  
• To provide an overview of the recent trends of corruption in Korea and the Philippines; 
• To examine the role of Korea’s ACRC and the Philippines’ OMB; 
• To determine, analyze, and compare the anti-corruption mechanisms, strategies, policies, 
and methodologies of the ACRC and OMB; and  
• To make recommendations by which the best practices of ACRC can be applied by the 
OMB in combating graft and corruption in the Philippines.  
 
III. Purpose of the Study  
 
It is the firm belief of the researcher that the Philippines, a corruption-stricken country, 
has much to learn from Korea in the area of fighting graft and corruption. Central to the main 
purpose of this study is to set forth areas of improvement by which the OMB can carry out its 
anti-corruption initiatives in light of the ACRC’s best practices in combating the problem.  
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IV. Significance of the Study 
 
The importance of the study rests upon the much-needed reforms on how the problem of 
graft and corruption is being confronted in the Philippines. Much of the problem as a result of the 
increasing number of government officials and employees wantonly committing the act in the 
face of the seemingly weak anti-graft and corruption strategies initiated by the country’s graft 
buster. Hence, this study could not come at a better time. The researcher hopes to throw light on 
the strengths of Korea’s anti-corruption efforts and recommend ways on how these best practices 
can be applied by the OMB. Results of the study will also provide significant insights to policy-
makers who aspire to strengthen the anti-graft and corruption strategies and mechanisms of the 
institution.  
 
V. Scope and Limitations 
 
 
While the fight against corruption is universal among nations, the researcher only focused 
on the cases of the Philippines and Korea. The researcher chose to limit the study involving the 
top graft busters in both countries namely, the ACRC of Korea and the OMB of the Philippines, 
in order to better gain understanding of the similarities and differences in the manner by which 
they handle and fight the problem of corruption.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
 
This chapter surveys previous works on corruption. Firstly, the researcher provides 
different definitions of corruption according to various international organizations. In the same 
sub-section, the researcher identifies the various kinds of corrupt behavior punishable by law in 
both Korea and the Philippines. In the subsequent sub-sections the researcher enumerates the 
causes of corruption in both countries as determined by previous scholars. These sections also 
include several accounts of previous incidences of corruption in Korea and the Philippines. 
Finally, the researcher reviews studies done on the anti-corruption strategies on various Soviet 
states and other Asian countries considered highly vulnerable to corruption.  
 
Corruption Defined 
 
 Since there is no universal definition of corruption, different organizations, policy-makers, 
and intellectuals have come up with various ways of defining the problem. According to the 
widely quoted 1997 Source Book of Transparency International (TI hereafter), corruption is a 
“behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in 
which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse 
of public power entrusted to them” (p.1). Meanwhile, Buckland of the Center for Applied 
Studies in International Negotiation (2007) simply defined corruption as “the misuse of public 
office or entrusted power for private gain” (p.5).  This definition provides a wide spectrum of 
behavior that is considered corrupt. In an effort to offer a more specific definition of corruption, 
Nye (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p.661) postulated that corruption is “a behavior 
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which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private- regarding (family, 
close private clique), pecuniary or status gain, or violates rules against the exercise of private – 
regarding influence.” Corrupt behavior under this definition includes bribery, nepotism, and 
misappropriation of public resources. The lack of an all encompassing definition of corruption 
merely illustrates its complicated nature and different forms. Hence, too often no universal 
definition is adopted by the government institutions mandated with fighting corruption as in the 
cases of Korea and the Philippines.  
 
 As stipulated in Korea’s “Anti-Corruption Act” (n.d., p.3), which was enacted by Act 
No.6494 on Jul. 24, 2001: 
“3. The term “act of corruption” means the act falling under any of the followings: 
 
(a) The act of any public official's seeking gains for himself/herself or for any 
third party by abusing his/her position or authority or violating Acts and subordinate 
statutes in connection with his/her duties; and 
(b) The act of causing damages to the property of any public agency in violation 
of Acts and subordinate statutes, in the process of executing the budget of the relevant 
public agency, acquiring, managing, or disposing of the property of the relevant public 
agency, or entering into and executing a contract to which the relevant public agency is a 
party.” 
  
Unlike that of Korea, the Philippine Republic Act 3019 or most popularly known as the 
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has a more precise and comprehensive listing of the 
different forms of graft and corruption as follows:   
“Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions 
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt 
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:  
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act 
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent 
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or 
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allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such 
violation or offense.  
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, 
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any 
contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the 
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.  
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other 
pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for 
whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or 
will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the 
help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.  
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a 
private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the 
pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.  
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving 
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the 
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest 
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall 
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged 
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.  
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient 
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him 
for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in 
the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of 
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating 
against any other interested party.  
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction 
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public 
officer profited or will profit thereby.  
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, 
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his 
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law 
from having any interest.  
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a 
material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel 
or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such 
approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of 
the board, committee, panel or group.  
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers 
responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular 
transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.  
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(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in 
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, 
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not 
so qualified or entitled.  
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his 
office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or 
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.  
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in 
subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment 
mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the 
confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together 
with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be 
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting 
business in any form with the Government.”  
 
As a complement to such law, the Republic Act 6713 or most commonly known as the 
Code of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees was also enacted in 1989. Based on the 
Philippine Center on Transnational Crimes (as cited by Obejas, n.d., p.98), the most common 
forms of corruption in the country include “tax invasion, ghost projects and payrolls, evasion of 
public bidding in public contracts, sub-contracting, nepotism and favoritism, extortion or giving 
of protection money (tong, in Pilipino), and bribery (lagay, in Pilipino).” Based on the laws 
provided herein, it is noteworthy that more diverse kinds of corruption behavior are recognized 
in the Philippines as compared in Korea.  
 
Causes of Corruption and Its Prevalence: The Korean Case  
 
A unique feature of corruption in Korea is that it has been recognized as one of the major 
factors that facilitated its economic boom in the past forty years in the form of money politics 
(Kang, 2002a). Roughly, corruption characterized the administration of Park Chung-hee, which 
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lasted from 1961 until 1979. He had worked with extensive interaction between the private 
actors who largely influenced his decision-making. During his administration, money politics 
had been overwhelming. As Kang (2002b) summarized it, “the basic process was simple: 
politicians used these political funds to buy votes and to serve basic greed (p.179).” With this 
scheme, the country was able to move forward and became one of the strongest economies in 
Asia until the financial crisis of 1997. Korea had recorded a miraculous average yearly GDP rate 
of 8 percent for the last forty years, from 1962 to 1996 (Sakong as cited in Bhargava & 
Bolongaita, 2004).  However, the financial crisis of the late 90’s badly hit the country and 
highlighted the weakness of such greed-based scheme.   
 
In his work, Johnston (2008) attempted to differentiate corruption in four Asian 
countries: Japan, the Philippines, Korea, and China. He contended that there are four syndromes 
of corruption namely; the influence markets (Japan), the elite cartels (Korea), the oligarchs and 
clans (Philippines) and official moguls (China). Using this category, he concluded that Korea has 
an elite cartel kind of corruption whereby, the networks involving “presidents, their families, and 
their personal entourages; heads of the chaebols (huge family-controlled conglomerates); 
bureaucratic elites, and military leaders…were bound together in part by corrupt incentives, but 
also by regional and family loyalties, the threat from the North, and the wish to stave off political 
and economic competition (Johnston, 2008, p.213).”  This arrangement had worked to pull the 
country up to economic domination in East Asia, until 1997 financial crisis thereby, showing the 
natural flaws and vulnerability of Korean government to corruption.  
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The early part of 1997 saw the bankruptcy of one of the Korea’s largest chaebol involved 
in steel manufacturing, the Hanbo Corporation (Kleiner, 2001). A series of investigations that 
followed uncovered the involvement of Kim Hyun Chul, the son of then President Kim Young 
Sam, in a bribery scheme that involved many politicians and executives from Hanbo. In spite of 
his denials, Hyun Chul Kim was prosecuted over bribery allegations and sentenced to be 
imprisoned for three years (reduced to two years in 1997) in addition to a large fine. With such 
landmark case, the seemingly sound and developed Korean economy suddenly found itself 
alongside the Philippines in terms of corruption level (Kang, 2002a).    
 
Former President Kim Young Sam might still be considered lucky compared to the fates 
of his two predecessors, ex-Presidents Chun Doo-hwan (Johnston, 2005) and Roh Tae-woo 
(Morriss, 1997), who were both charged for corruption, the former was sentenced to death while 
the latter was given 22 years time in prison but was cut short to 17 (Marshall Cavendish 
Corporation, 2008). Both, however, would be later on pardoned by President Kim Young-Sam. 
Over a decade later, then President Roh Moo-hyun would find himself facing the same fate over 
series of corruption allegations against him and his immediate family. Accusations revolved 
around ex-President Roh’s brother for taking bribes from wealthy businessmen in exchange of 
political favors. By the end of the first quarter of 2009, Roh’s wife and their son, Geon-ho had 
been formally questioned for their alleged involvement in several bribery instances that took 
place at Blue House during Roh’s reign (English Chosun, 2009). On April 30, the ex-President, 
who had been hailed for his democratic ideals, faced prosecutors and was deeply ashamed of the 
suspicions against him and his family (The Hankyoreh, 2009). Less than a month later, Roh 
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stunned the world including his political critics, for committing suicide putting a tragic end to 
his legacy to his nation (The Korea Times, 2009).  
 
According to Jong (as cited in Johnston, 2005), corruption in Korea is not all about 
money in politics as there are considerable cases of bureaucratic corruption and bribery as 
consequences of too many unnecessary rules for the business sector to follow. Hence, political 
corruption had been widespread as politicians sought the monetary support of business tycoons 
in their campaign. After winning, they, in return, had to “repay” the favor by providing 
“business opportunities” to these supporters (Bhargava and Bolongaita, 2004, p.146). This way, 
corruption had actually, as Chang (n.d.) theorized, become an indispensable component of the 
Korean economic system by facilitating the flows of monetary capital from the private sectors 
to the government. Hence, this corrupt system had been functional for Korea while the opposite 
had been true for the Philippines (Kang, 2002a). 
 
In a collaborative work, Bhargava and Bolongaita (2004) cited that, corruption in Korea 
is “a result of dilapidated systems with insufficient risks and abundant gains for corruption, 
opaque administrative process, socio-cultural customs, and unclear ethical administration 
(p.148).” Looking at it using this perspective, Korea, then is not at all different from the 
Philippines, particularly in terms of having socio-cultural values that seem tolerant to corrupt 
behavior.  
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Causes of Corruption and Its Prevalence: The Philippine Case 
 
 Meanwhile, in a developing country like the Philippines, corruption occurs due to a 
variety of reasons including (Obejas, n.d., pp.6-7):  
 
“1. The quest for individual survival, brought about by poverty, lack of basic 
needs, low salaries, etc.; 
2. Wide disparity between the rich and the poor; 
3. The Filipino cultural values of personalism, familism, pakikisama (getting 
along), utang-na-loob (debt of gratitude) and damayan (sympathy) for another’s 
misery or problem; 
4. Greed or the insatiable desire to amass more wealth, assets or property; 
5. Comfort. As corruption provides easy money, the corrupted enjoy the easy life; 
6. Convenience and expediency. These causes are particularly applicable to the 
corruptor who usually desires to facilitate the approval, grant and/or release of 
request or proposal and avoid the rigors of red tape in the bureaucracy.” 
 
  
It is worth mentioning that poverty seems to be the prevalent reason for corruption in the country. 
It is also interesting to note that, as previously discussed, the Philippines is similar to Korea in terms of 
the socio-cultural values that breed such evil.  
 
 
Other scholars, however, stress the lack of the rule of law in the country as the main 
contributing factor to the problem. Beschel (1999) concluded that there is inconsistency in the 
sanctioning of graft offenders in the country whereby, “the rich, the powerful, and the politically 
well-connected” (p.8) could easily get away with their corrupt acts. The ideal example of which 
is illustrated in the most celebrated corruption case against the country’s ex-President Joseph 
Estrada who was found guilty of plunder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2008.  Thus, 
within the same year, the country saw its triumph and downfall against corruption. While it had 
successfully held a high-ranking official accountable for corruption however, his pardon had, 
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unsurprisingly, given encouragement to even the most low-ranking government officials and 
employees to commit or continuously execute their corruptive behaviors. 
 
Such inconsistency in applying laws and the fact that there exists low detection rate 
significantly explains why corruption thrives in the country. Compared to Hong Kong, Beschel 
(1999) suggested that offenders had a greater chance, about 35 times, to be found out in Hong 
Kong than in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Quah (2003) concluded that Philippines ranks with 
Thailand in terms of low detection of corruptive activities among civil servants. In both countries, 
corruption is considered “a low risk and high reward activity” (p.243). For the Philippines, 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew (as cited by Quah, 2003) blames it to the “soft, forgiving culture” 
of Filipinos that until now, Marcos and his allies had never been punished for corruption. 
Perhaps, part of this culture is the tendency of the Filipinos to easily forget the abuses they 
received from public officials and affinity to focus on their good deed, if one could call it that. 
 
In his book, Johnston (2005) accounted for the main role of the few powerful elite in the 
politics of Korea and the Philippines, particularly during the Marcos administration. If, on the 
one hand, Korea has the towering business people who, with their money, exert their influence 
on the decisions of the politicians, the Philippines, on the other hand, has the so-called “oligarchs 
and clans” robbing the country blind since Marcos’ era. To date, the general image of the country 
is that of corruption and nepotism (Kimura, 2003) and was best described by (Riedinger, 1995, 
Sidel, 1997, 2000, and Moran, 1999 as cited in Johnston, 2005, p.137) as follows:  
“over 84 million people live on the more than 7,000 islands of the 
Philippine archipelago, but politics and the economy are dominated by only 
about eighty families.” 
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In the Philippines, these oligarchs “have engaged in pervasive corruption, inhibiting the 
growth of democratic forces while enriching themselves in both the public and private sectors” 
(Johnston, 2008, p. 214). Hence, to understand the context of corruption in the country requires 
an overview of the role of oligarchs in its political system.  
 
 Similar to Korea, the Philippines has its own tale of bringing the highest-ranking public 
official, the President, to trial over allegations of massive corruption. It was the story of the so-
called “darling of the mass” ex-President Estrada, who was voted into presidency with a 
landslide victory in 1998. He was an actor-turned-politician with a lot of help from his 1961 
movie portrayal of “Asiong Salonga” (CNN, 2001) who was considered as the Filipino version 
of Robin Hood. He was seen as the hero of the poor, much of the reason is attributed to the 
different way he climbed into power. Under this banner, his party emerged triumphant during the 
1998 election, but his term was cut short by a peaceful people revolution two years later. The so-
called Second People Power that brought his fall occurred shortly after he was accused by an 
influential governor, his former bosom-friend, of receiving bribes from jueteng (lottery) lords 
(Bernardo, 2008). In 2001, Estrada was ousted, charged with several counts of corruption acts 
involving millions of jueteng kickbacks, and brought under house arrest. Six years thereafter, 
Filipinos would witness his conviction and sentencing to serve prison for life with most of his 
assets seized by the government. However, victory for his prosecutors was short-lived with 
incumbent President Arroyo lifting the sentence by giving him the quickest unconditional pardon 
in Philippine history (Duka, 2008).  
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Curbing Corruption 
 
 
 
 The multi-faceted nature of corruption also implies that it can be addressed in many 
different ways. Over the years, there had been constant calls to action from various local and 
international anti-corruption groups to curb corruption at all levels of government. In fact, the 
creation of many international anti-corruption institutions, anti-corruption efforts from many 
international pro-development organizations (World Bank 1997, UNDP, 1997 as cited in 
Landette, 2002), and the conduct of surveys among corrupt-prone states by groups such as 
Transparency International are all strong indications of such intense concern to fight corruption.   
 
 Under the overarching umbrella of anti-corruption strategy, countries make efforts to 
address the very root of the problem. One popular recommendation under this program is to 
make corruption “a high-risk and low-reward activity” (Lanseth, Stapenhhurst, and Pope, 2006 
as cited in Landette, 2002, p.10).  
 
 The OECD (2008, p21) defined anti-corruption strategy as:  
  “a policy document which analyses problems, sets objectives, identifies 
main areas of action (e.g. prevention and repression of corruption and public 
education) and establishes an implementation mechanism.”  
 
 
 Without an action plan, the anti-corruption strategy has no teeth to curb the problem of 
corruption. It is said that anti-corruption strategies are public declarations of the government 
commitment and indication of its “political will and policy direction” (OECD, 2008, p. 19). A 
survey by the OECD (2008) reviewed eight former Soviet countries that are covered by its 
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Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan. The eight states included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Russian, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. The study revealed that a “special public policy 
against corruption” (p.9) is necessary to effectively send the message of strong political will to 
stamp out corruption among highly-corruption prone countries. It is also recommended in the 
study that “research and surveys about the extent and patterns of corruption” be conducted in 
order to determine the real causes of the problem. It is also urged that a more active participation 
of NGOs be encouraged in order for anti-corruption strategies to produce concrete results. 
Intensive “awareness-raising efforts” and establishment of “institutional support for anti-
corruption reforms” (p.10) are also highly recommended in order to make any significant 
difference in the area of fighting corruption. Improvements in the area of criminalization of 
corruption must also be done. These should be done in countries where: there exist parallel 
systems of administrative and criminal liability for corruption-related offenses; there is no 
established laws against offering, promising, requesting and soliciting bribes as separate 
offenses; there is broad immunities for public officials and lack of precise procedures to lift 
them; and weak implementation of extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA) legislation.  
 
 Meanwhile, studies on the different anti-corruptions strategies in various Asian countries 
including Korea and the Philippines had been done before by scholars like Bhargava and 
Bolongaita (2004). These studies broadly surveyed four Asian countries namely: the Philippines, 
South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. While they already offered important lessons in 
challenging corruption in Asia in light of the cases including the subjects of the present study, 
the researcher felt the need to update such insights and information. Moreover, the present study 
is an attempt to focus on the specific cases of the main anti-corruption arms of Korea and the 
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Philippines. The emphasis is on the lessons that will be drawn upon the similarities and 
differences between the two agencies.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY  
 
 This chapter includes discussions on the research designs, methods, and instruments used 
to achieve the purpose of the study. It also provides a brief explanation of the rationale behind 
the researcher’s choices herein. Meanwhile, the succeeding two sub-sections cover the kind of 
information used in the study and their sources. This part also offers a succinct description of the 
selected research subjects.  
 
 
I. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
 
 
The research is qualitative which provides an in-depth knowledge involving the subjects 
under consideration. Taking into account the purposes of the study, the researcher decided to 
utilize qualitative data for it has the advantage of revealing rich information. As described by 
Amaratunga, et. al. (2002), “such data provide rich descriptions that are vivid, nested in a real 
life context, and have a ring of truth (pp.21-22).” The researcher’s intent is not to put emphasis 
on breadth but rather on the depth of the data that were gathered. Thus, this study does not aim to 
capture broad issues on anti-corruption strategies but it does include an intensive discussion on 
how OMB can modify each of the anti-corruption strategies that ACRC implements. 
Additionally, the researcher is concerned with data that cannot be captured efficiently by any 
quantitative methods. Thus, qualitative methods are more appropriate and useful in conducting 
the study considering that the researcher’s purpose is to find patterns, similarities, differences of 
the two organizations under study. 
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 The study is also a descriptive one whereby, the emphasis is on providing narratives on 
the crusade against corruption by ACRC of Korea and the OMB of the Philippines. It also 
contains analytic elements by virtue of the researcher efforts to evaluate how the two 
organizations as anti-corruption agencies differ from each other.   
 
 
II. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
For the purpose of the study, the research conducted a comparative analysis by 
examining case studies of the policies, strategies and methodologies of ACRC and the OMB in 
addressing the issue of graft and corruption. An analysis of the similarities and differences of 
these agencies as their countries’ top graft busters was also included. 
 
The researcher had made full use of Internet websites in finding literature and other 
information about the corruption in Korea and the Philippines and on the histories, organizational 
structures, anti-corruption strategies and accomplishments of ACRC and the OMB.  
 
 
III. RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS  
 
 
 
The researcher compared the ACRC and the OMB on the basis of their roles, anti-
corruptions mechanisms, strategies, policies, and methodologies. This study followed closely the 
instruments used by Landette (2008) whereby, “the comparison includes a discussion of the 
background leading to the creation of these agencies, a matrix of their characteristics; internal 
structure, legal framework, scope of action and other key organizational arrangements”(pp.7-8). 
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Conclusions and recommendations were based on the main components of all these factors that 
had been useful for the two organizations in their struggle to achieve the purpose for which they 
had been created. Interviews were also conducted with the key personnel from ACRC and the 
OMB to further enlighten the researcher on the key areas of concerns.  
 
IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION  
 
 
The researcher relied on the primary sources of information such as available documents 
from the ACRC’s and the OMB online resources (websites). Personal interviews of the key 
personnel from both organizations were conducted only when there are information not readily 
found in the Internet and other printed data. Secondary resources were also utilized in the forms 
of the previous scholarly works by other policy-makers, academicians, and scholars conducted 
about the subject. 
 
V. RESEARCH SUBJECTS  
 
 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the study highlighted the role and experiences of 
the ACRC of Korea and the OMB of the Philippines in fighting corruption. As an anti-graft 
investigator, the researcher deemed it necessary to learn important lessons from the Korean 
experience in the area of combating corruption. These lessons she hoped to share with her 
mother agency. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the top anti-corruption agencies in Korea and the 
Philippines, the ACRC and the OMB, respectively. The following discussion includes their brief 
histories, mandates, organizational structures and general idea of their anti-corruption strategies. 
. 
Fighting Corruption: The Korean Experience 
 
As a response to the need for a more harmonized effort to address the problem of 
corruption in Korea, the ACRC was established in February 1998 (Asian Ombudsman 
Association, n.d.[a]). It is the result of the integration of Korea’s three long-standing anti-
corruption agencies namely; Ombudsman of Korea, the Korea Independent Commission against 
Corruption (KICAC), and the Administrative Appeals Commission (AAC). Thus, tracing the 
roots of Anti-corruption and Civil Rights Commission of Korea (ACRC) requires an overview of 
these three organizations.  
 
Ombudsman of Korea  
 
In 1994, the Ombudsman of Korea was created with the aim of protecting the rights and 
interests of Korean people. The agency handled complaints and reports from those citizens 
whose civil rights had been violated. It was independent and neutral by virtue of the Framework 
Act on Administrative Regulation and Civil Petitions (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
Commission, 2008). 
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It grew as an agency fully committed to investigation of civil rights violation reports. To 
further strengthen its institutional capability, a centralized complaint counseling center was also 
established. Eventually, the Ombudsman of Korea was legally abolished by the Act of Anti-
Corruption with the creation of the ACRC on February 29, 2008 (Anti-Corruption and Civil 
Rights Commission, 2008). 
 
Korea Independent Commission against Corruption (KICAC) 
 
Following the ratification of the Anti-corruption Act and Money Laundering Prevention 
Act in 2001, the KICAC was launched pursuant to the Anti-corruption Act in January 25, 2002 
(Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption, n.d.). KICAC had performed several anti-
corruption functions involving coordination of national anti-corruption initiatives, improvement 
of legal and institutional frameworks, handling of corruption reports, protection of 
whistleblowers (as well as giving them rewards), increasing public awareness about corruption 
issues, cooperation with civil society, and participation in the global fight against corruption.  
 
Administrative Appeals Commission  
 
 Originally, the Administrative Appeals Commission (AAC) was part of the Ministry of 
Legislation, which was created along with the founding of the Government of Korean Republic 
in 1948. The Ministry is tasked with the formulation of rules and regulations governing the 
administrative legislation of the Korean government. It oversaw the operations of the 
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Administrative Appeals Commission which was then and still is under the supervision of the 
Office of the Prime Minister (Ministry of Legislation, n.d.).  
 
 In 2008, the Administrative Appeals Commission became part of the ACRC. The 
commission still maintains its primary functions as the agency that is responsible for helping 
people gain back their rights that were violated in the process of managing the administrative 
complaints (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, n.d.[a]). 
 
ACRC and its Inception  
 
 ACRC is an upshot of the determined effort of the Korean government to create an 
independent and more efficient anti-corruption organization. The integration of the three pre-
existing anti-corruption agencies namely; Ombudsman of Korea, KICAC, and AAC, is depicted 
below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Integration of Ombudsman of Korea, KICAC and AAC into one independent agency, the 
ACRC. 
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In a nutshell, the functions of the ACRC can be classified into two: to combat corruption 
problems and to guard civil rights. The integration of these three agencies did no harm in their 
original objectives. The Ombudsman of Korea continues to exist as the primary protector of 
people’s rights, while the KICAC retains its main purpose to promote anti-corruption policies. In 
a similar vein, AAC remains as the main litigator in any disputes involving administrative 
matters. Hence, combining the three agencies resulted in a one-stop service to the public. Before, 
the separation of powers often got people confused, so with the creation of ACRC the public can 
make convenient use of the services that the three agencies provide (Asian Ombudsman 
Association, n.d.[a]).  
 
More concretely, there are three functions that the agency performs as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Three main functions of ACRC (ACRC n.d., p.6.). 
 
 
Handle and address public complaints and  
improve related unreasonable systems 
Build a clean society by preventing and  
deterring corruption in the public sector 
Protect people’s rights from illegal and unfair administrative 
practices through the administrative appeals system 
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 The ACRC has 15 commissioners composed of 1 chairman, 3 vice-chairmen (vice-
minister-level), 8 non-standing commissioners, and 3 standing commissioners. All 15 
commissioners work independently and their status is protected by the law (See Annex A). 
 
ACRC and its Anti-Corruption Activities   
 
 In its Anti-Corruption Annual Report for the year 2008, the Anti-Corruption and Civil 
Rights Commission (2009) outlined ten major anti-corruption activities (p.9) as follows:  
1. Establishing and coordinating national anti-corruption policies 
2. Conducting customized integrity consulting 
3. Measuring corruption and assessing anti-corruption initiatives 
4. Corruption impact assessment 
5. Promoting improvement of anti-corruption systems 
6. Operating corruption reporting system 
7. Protecting and rewarding whistleblowers 
8. Enforcing the code of conduct for public organization employees 
9. Integrity education, PR and international cooperation 
10. Comprehensive management of anti-corruption information  
 
ACRC and Its Accomplishments 
 
 Since the ACRC does not have the prosecution power, conviction rate or the ratio of 
conviction given cases prosecuted is not applicable to gauge its success. Instead, it has the 
immediate outcome of its various assessment indices that can readily be converted to monetary 
value (Korean Won or KRW). For instance, as a result of its Corruption Impact Assessment of 
administrative rules (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission Korea, 2009, p.25) it was 
able to isolate approximately 396 areas in need of revisions from the Ministry of Land, Transport 
and Maritime Affairs (94), Ministry of Knowledge Economy (129), Ministry of National 
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Defense (80), and Financial Services Commission and the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (with a combined number of 93). The improvement covering only 33 cases 
generated 2.74 trillion KRW. As regard its Operating Corruption Reporting System, the 
commission was able to recover a total amount of 74.3 billion KRW.   
 
 Moreover, it had been proven also to be efficient in detecting corruption as shown below: 
(Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2009, p.33).  
 
Figure 3. Corruption Detection Rate of ACRC (See Annex B). 
 
 As shown above, the corruption detection rate of the commission did not falter to below 
60%, which indicates that the system is very useful in uncovering cases of corruption.  
 
On the one hand, the succeeding graph revealed the amounts of money that were 
recovered by the commission via the reporting system (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
Commission, 2009, p.33). 
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          Figure 4. Money Recovered by ACRC (See Annex C). 
 
Meanwhile, one recent study reveals that the overall anti-corruption effectiveness 
indicator (AEI)1 shows a fluctuating trend for the past six years which calls for more established 
and integrated efforts to curb corruption in Korea (Choi, 2009). Nonetheless, similar study also 
notes that the commission, particularly KICAC, has “fairly good” detection rates however; the 
inferior prosecution rate undermines the success of the strategies against corruption.  
 
 
Fighting Corruption: The Philippine Experience 
 
 
The Office of the Ombudsman: An Overview 
 
The legal framework of the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is embedded in the 
1987 Philippine Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, also recognized as the Ombudsman 
Act of 1989 (Office of the Ombudsman,2004). The Office is created independent and is given 
specific powers, functions and duties. As mandated by law, the OMB can act on any reports in 
                                                            
1 According to the economics of enforcement, AEI refers to the product of the probability of detection, probability 
of arrest given detection, probability of prosecution given arrest, probability of conviction given prosecution, and 
penalty which is the amount of money imposed on offenders (Choi, 2009, p. 202).  
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whatever form (news, formal anonymous or named complaint, etc.). It has the legal power to 
impose administrative, civil, and/or criminal penalties on any public officials or employees who 
would be found guilty of any corrupt acts. Its power goes beyond prevention of graft and 
corruption to investigation and prosecution of any suspected corrupt government officials.  
 
 Pursuant to the law, the OMB should act on any report with administrative nature that 
involves (but is not limited to) act or omission that is “(1) contrary to law or regulation, (2) 
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory, (3) consistent with the general course of an 
agency’s functions, though in accordance with law, (4) proceed from a mistake of law or an 
arbitrary ascertainment of facts, (5) in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper 
purpose, or (6) otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification (Asian Ombudsman 
Association, n.d.[b], par.3). 
  
 Specifically, the Office has the duty to subject any government officials at the managerial 
level and above with a monthly earning of around Php 25,764 to Php 63,525 (roughly $550 to 
$1356). During the investigation phase on any complaint, the OMB has the power to serve a 
subpoena to any government offices and letter-request to non-government agencies in order to 
request appearances or any documents deemed necessary. In case of non-compliance from any 
government officials or employees, it can subject them for contempt of court (Asian Ombudsman 
Association, n.d.[b]).  
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The OMB and Its Organizational Structure 
 
 As stated in the Republic Act 6770, the Office should have an operational organizational 
structure (see Annex D). The appointed Ombudsman has the supervisory and managerial 
command of the entire Office. She/he has the power to organize the overall administrative 
functions and handles other associated operations as she/he sees fits. Meanwhile the Overall 
Deputy Ombudsman has the power to supervise and direct how the various bureaus of the Office 
should operate (Asian Ombudsman Association, n.d.[b]). 
 
 The OMB has a branch in each of the three big islands of the country. The OMB Luzon 
has jurisdiction over all cases and complaints concerning government officials working in Luzon. 
Recently, a regional office of OMB was opened in Laguna Province. Respectively, the OMB 
Visayas situated in Cebu covers all corruption cases committed by government officials based in 
Visayan Island. Meanwhile, OMB Mindanao is mandated to act on cases involving government 
officials assigned in public offices in Mindanao areas. However, a complaint can be referred to 
OMB Central depending on its nature. If it is a lifestyle case, the complaint will be forwarded to 
the Field Investigation Office (FIO hereafter).  
 
 An inherent part of the OMB is the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It serves as the 
prosecutorial body of the Office. Similar to the appointment of the Ombudsman and Deputies, 
the Special Prosecutor is directly appointed by the President. However, the Ombudsman has the 
power to manage and oversee the activities of the deputies and special prosecutor. The Office 
also has a Research and Special Studies Bureau which is mandated to conduct relevant studies on 
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various laws with the aim of improving them for greater efficiency of delivering government 
services to the public (Asian Ombudsman Association,n.d.[b]). 
 
The OMB and Its Anti-Corruption Activities 
 
 The OMB anti-corruption activities are categorized into five wide areas such as 
prosecution and deterrence, prevention and public assistance, education and anti-corruption 
promotion, national anti-corruption program of action (NACPA) and linkages with other 
government agencies (Office of the Ombudsman, 2008b, par.1). 
 
The OMB and its Accomplishments 
 
 A survey of written works on the effectiveness of the OMB in its fight against corruption 
reveals a wide contradiction. Based on the conviction rate, which refers to the “ratio of 
conviction of cases prosecuted” (Ramseyer, et. al., 2008: abstract), the efforts of the OMB are 
largely wanting. One media reports (Abs-cbn. Com, 2009: par. 10-11) that from 1979 to 2008, 
the Sandiganbayan, the high court which tries cases filed for prosecution by the Ombudsman, 
have recorded less than three out of each ten criminal cases against corrupt government public 
officials. Out of 29,531 criminal cases that the court had resolved starting 1979, merely 8,477 
cases had resulted in convictions. Simply put, it had just recorded a 28.71 conviction rate since 
then. The breakdown of cases is shown as follows: 
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If the annual conviction rate is analyzed (Enriquez-Geron, n.d.), the findings would 
present a differing reality.  In 2002, the OMB’s conviction rate was 6%. In 2005, it increased to 
33% to 40% in 2006. In the beginning of 2007, it recorded a conviction rate of 77%. Meanwhile, 
a report (Philippine Embassy Updates, 2009: par. 1) claims that this year, the OMB has recorded 
a conviction rate of 73.42% which is in blatant contrast to that of one media group’s, 11.86% for 
the first half of the 2009 (Abs-cbn,com, 2009: par.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 5. Cases Resolved by OMB from 1979 to present. 
  Legend: 29% - cases resulted to convictions; 31%- cases archived; 14%-cases dismissed; 11%cases resulted to 
acquittals; 10%-referred to other courts or returned; 5%-withdrawn by the OMB; and less than 0% - cases 
returned for further review (Abs-cbn, 2009, par. 13)
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 Similar report summarized the OMB’s accomplishments as follows:  
 
 
Figure 6. Accomplishment of OMB. 
Legend: OMB –Ombudsman ; RIPS – Revenue Integrity Protection Service or “Lifestyle Checks”; RATE – Run 
After the Tax Evaders; RATS: Run After the Smugglers; DOJ – Department of Justice; CTA ‘ Court of Tax Appeals.  
 
 
 
 
 In an unpublished article by the Human Development Network (HDN) (2009), Is there 
institutional weakness? By Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN), the anti-corruption 
mechanisms of the OMB were critically challenged. The leadership issues were also put into 
limelight for evaluation. It cited the results of the survey conducted by the Social Weather 
Stations (SWS) which highlighted the following:  
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Year Net Sincerity Rating (Very Somewhat 
Sincere – Somewhat/Very Insincere) 
Ombudsman  
2000 -5  
Disierto 2001 +7 
2002 Na  
Marcelo 2003 +21 
2004 +28 
2005 +22 
2006 +6  
Gutierrez  2007 +9 
2008 +4 
Table 2. SWS Survey Results Perception of the Sincerity of Former Ombudsmen, Disierto and Marcelo 
and Incumbent Ombudsman, Gutierrez. 
 
 Among the three leaders, it appears that the former Ombudsman Marcelo was the most 
favored. During his time, the priority was to strengthen the OMB, particularly its investigative 
arm. He then created the FIO which heavily pursued lifestyle cases against high-rankingranking 
military officals and bureau officials. He  recruited over 100 new investigators, mostly fresh 
graduates from different fields such as engineering, law, social sciences, and other natural 
sciences, to man the FIO. Ideally, his vision was to match the capability of the Hong kong’s 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). During his time, he relied heavily on 
former ICAC former Chairman Tony Kwok and had targeted “big fish” to create deterrence 
measures for those corrupt officials. His efforts resulted to a significant increase in the OMB’s 
conviction rate from 6% to 14% (Monsod as quoted in Human Development Network, 2009).  
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 While other programs made by Ombudsman Marcelo were retained, such as  Lifestyle 
Checks and the conduct of various training programs for the employees under the leadership of 
Ombudsman Gutierrez, however, overall, the OMB’s direction had been refocused. Priorities 
were given to activities such as Oplan Red Plate, which is a duplication of work of the Civil 
Service Commission (CSC), and creation of task forces on issues human trafficking and 
smuggling which is being also addressed by other investigative agencies. Moreover, it appears 
that the OMB has unclear focus in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. A lot of task forces had 
been created depending upon the “hotness” of the issues to the media. The conduct of social 
services to the marginalized sectors of the country is way out of the OMB’s mandates, not to 
mention the fact that such activities are in the hands of agencies such as Department of Social 
Welfare and Development. It appears that the OMB has many things in its hands. While there is 
corruption in the areas of human trafficking and smuggling, it takes time to dig deeper. 
Meanwhile, there are corruption cases that happen in broad daylight that the OMB can focus on 
and will certainly provide deterrence measures against erring public officials.  
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CHAPTER V 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 This chapter is divided into two sections. On the one hand, the first section summarizes 
the major similarities and differences between the two anti-corruption institutions in terms of 
strategies in combating corruption in their respective countries. While on the other hand, the 
author focuses on how each of the ten anti-corruption strategies of the ACRC can be applied by 
the OMB.  
 
Similarities and Differences 
 
 
 
 Apparently, there exist only few similarities between Korea’s ACRC and the Philippines’ 
OMB. Firstly, both the ACRC and the OMB are independent anti-corruption institutions with 
clear mandates. Secondly, both recognize the importance of having links with the relevant 
government agencies, private institutions, and civil society in combating corruption. Thirdly, 
although not central to its focus, the OMB also has a corruption diagnostic tool in the form of 
Integrity Development Review of corruption-prone government institutions which is similar to 
the customized integrity that ACRC conducts. Lastly, both recognize the need to cultivate a 
culture of integrity by involving the youth in their fight against corruption, from educating them 
to soliciting their participation to their anti-corruption campaigns.  
 
 
 Noteworthy, however, are the major differences between the ACRC and the OMB that 
are rooted from the very nature of their mandates. The ACRC does not have the prosecutorial 
powers that the OMB has. ACRC is more focused on enhancing the capabilities of Korean 
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government offices in addressing their own weaknesses by conducting diagnostic evaluations of 
these organizations to find areas of improvement in their rules and operations. Thus, ACRC 
helps the agency in two ways. On the one hand, ACRC helps in strengthening the institutional 
capacity of each agency to detect corrupt behaviors of its own employees. On the other hand, it 
helps the government agencies prevent corrupt behavior by reducing opportunities that comes 
with improving weak areas identified through the various assessment surveys that it conducts.    
 
Meanwhile, the OMB’s efforts can be classified as more of reactive strategies as 
evidenced by the creation of task forces to address corruption reports. Considering this, it can be 
regarded that ACRC has a clearer focus in performing its mandates particularly, in preventing 
and deterring corruption than the OMB as manifested by such “extraneous” activities such as the 
creation of task forces on human trafficking and smuggling and the conduct of various social 
services. Such issues, as discussed earlier, may involve relevant corruption cases however, there 
already exists specific agencies handling those issues such as the National Bureau of 
Investigation, Bureau of Customs, and Bureau of Immigration. Since the OMB also welcomes 
and acts on corruption reports from these agencies, there is practically no need to create special 
task forces on such issues. This only inevitably results to “wasted” resources and time given its 
limitations in terms of manpower and finances. 
 
Moreover, the ACRC has the advantage of having installed a functional whistle blowing 
protection system. This can explain the strong detection rate of the commission’s reporting 
system. Such is largely wanting in the Philippine anti-corruption system although a bill has 
already been proposed; it is still pending approval of the Congress.  
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The study also reveals that one of the major differences of the ACRC and the 
Ombudsman has to do with the success indicator that can be used in assessing their effectiveness. 
Although there were some attempts, unlike ACRC, the OMB never had been consistent in 
translating the benefits of its anti-corruption activities into monetary terms. OMB also lacks any 
index measures of its effectiveness. Hence, all too often it finds itself in a defensive stance over 
the poor results of any surveys assessing its performance using the general public perception. 
Except for the conviction rate, which calculation can be highly controversial to many, it has no 
other performance index measure. 
 
What lessons can be learned from ACRC Anti-Corruption Strategies? 
 
 While there are more differences than similarities between ACRC and the OMB this does 
not diminish the fact that OMB still stands to benefit from the corruption detection strategies that 
ACRC implements. Concrete steps on how each of the ten anti-corruption strategies of ACRC 
can be modified in a way that can be adopted by the OMB are as follows.  
 
1. Establishing and coordinating national anti-corruption policies 
 
 
 At least two major events happened last year that clearly challenged the OMB’s 
institutional capacity and had shown its lack of public trust.  Last March 2009, 31 civil 
society groups joined forces to file an impeachment cases against the current 
Ombudsman citing inaction, mishandling, and downright dismissal of clear cases of graft 
and corruption as its grounds (Cabacungan, Jr., G.C. and Dalangin-Fernandez, L. 2009, 
2009, par. 4).  
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 As if that was not enough, in June 2009, a predawn bomb explosion rocked the 
compound of the OMB’s office, startling nearby residents and causing some damage to 
its property (Tubeza, 2009). These are just indications of how badly OMB is being 
perceived as the so-called “watchdog” of the country against erring public officials; that 
there are people who are resolve to carry their grudges to such extent. This might be due 
to simple ignorance or misinterpretation of the general public about the anti-corruption 
strategies and policies of the OMB. Hence, a forum whereby, each government agency 
will be kept aware of the functions and recent developments in the anti-corruption efforts 
of the OMB is seen useful especially if the institution would want to address the issues 
confronting the country’s most corruption-prone agencies. Through said forum the OMB 
can send the message to these agencies that fighting corruption must not be a “lone-man-
battle”. The responsibility should be shared by them and the OMB. In conducting said 
forum, one of the objectives should be for the OMB to be informed of the anti-corruption 
strategies that these agencies carry out. Said forum must be conducted regularly by the 
OMB representatives and key personnel of the concerned agencies.    
 
2. Conducting customized integrity consulting 
 
 
 The Integrity Development Review (IDR) is a similar mechanism to ACRC’s 
“customized integrity consulting” that the OMB implements. Not unlike the latter, the 
IDR is part and parcel of the OMB’s corruption prevention mechanism. OMB conducts 
assessment of subject government agency in terms of its vulnerability to corrupt 
behaviors. IDR looks into individual (leadership, code of ethics, gifts and benefits policy), 
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organizational (procurement management, human resource management, corruption risk 
management, performance management, and the like), and environment (managing 
interface with external environment) factors that can be sources of corruption in an 
agency. It also examines the agency’s programs and regular performance of its duties and 
functions, and the internal control system, if there is any (Baliton, 2008). 
 
 However, the current mechanism has some inherent weaknesses. Although, there 
were 18 government agencies that had already participated, the agency admittedly lacks 
the evaluation and monitoring tool. Moreover, while most of the policy suggestions had 
already been implemented in agencies subjected to IDR, still no evaluation study is being 
conducted to determine whether such changes have significant impacts on the reduction 
of corruption in said agencies. 
 
 To better assess whether IDR is an effective tool in preventing corruption, 
evaluation study on the impact of the changes implemented must be conducted. Such 
study has to be conducted by a committee composed of representatives from the subject 
agencies, selected OMB personnel, and chosen members of civil society groups and 
academe who have the expertise to do so.  
 
3. Measuring corruption and assessing anti-corruption initiatives 
 
 
  Aside from customized integrity consulting considered as an internal integrity 
evaluation mechanism whereby government agencies are required to look into its own 
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corruption vulnerabilities, ACRC also conducts a Corruption Perception Survey every 
year which is considered an external integrity assessment system. The survey was 
launched in 2002 and is invaluable in providing up-to-date information on the perception 
of the general public on corruption in various Korean government offices. Results of this 
survey are useful in guiding anti-corruption policy-making particularly in areas of 
“enforcement of public officials’ code of conduct” and “promotion of institutional 
improvement” (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2009, p.18). ACRC 
considers that by providing media access to the survey results it is then able to heighten 
public consciousness regarding the issue of transparency in the government.  
 
  Such survey can also be implemented by the OMB but using a different 
methodology. Due to the sheer volume of people transacting business with different 
government agencies every day, interview survey through phone is considered costly and 
time consuming. As of today, the OMB-Field Investigation Office Lifestyle (LSC) and 
Anti-Fixer Hotline is already installed with an average of 5 and 25 complainants through 
phone calls and text messages respectively, every day. Using the information in its 
database, the OMB can conduct similar study. The study will look into the most common 
government agencies that are subjects of complaints from its customers. Moreover, 
following points can be addressed:  
 
• What are the most common complaints received? 
• Which agencies received the most complaints regarding fixers? 
• Which agencies received the most complaints regarding employees 
with excessive lifestyles not at all commensurate to their legitimate 
income? 
• What complaints can be addressed through mediation?  
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The possible survey/study will differ from the ACRC Corruption Perception 
Survey since it will be based on actual reports of corruption behavior/acts and not mere 
perception of the public. Such hotline data is a rich source of information that can be used 
by the OMB to come up with the most up-to-date and effective anti-corruption strategies 
for each subject government agency. These data can also be useful in the conduct of 
systemic studies on government agencies that is part of OMB’s IDR program.  
 
4. Corruption impact assessment 
 
 
 
Pursuant to the Article 28, Review of Corruption-Causing Factors in Laws, of the 
“Act on Anti-Corruption and the Establishment and Operation of the Anti-Corruption and 
Civil Rights Commission”, the ACRC conducts a Corruption Impact Assessment starting 
2008. This impact assessment has the following objectives (Anti-Corruption and Civil 
Rights Commission, 2009, p.22):  
 
(1) Preventing the occurrence of corruption by eliminating uncertain concepts, 
blank rules, and unrealistic criteria in laws beforehand;  
(2) Preparing an effective base to promote the eradication of corruption by 
analyzing and assessing the inherent cause of corruption in legal and 
institutional areas prone to corruption; and  
(3) Enhancing the reliability and predictability of policies through raising 
appropriateness of discretionary criteria in the course of legislating and 
executing laws and decrees and increasing transparency in the administration.  
 
 
 
With strong determination and consistency, the OMB’s IDR will ultimately 
achieve what ACRC’s Corruption Impact Assessment was able to do by far. Reforms 
introduced in light of the agency’s IDR’s results had been limited to directing the 
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participating government agencies, especially, income-generating offices, to reduce the 
number of their processing days to setting up code of conducts. So far, no attention was 
ever given to reduction or even eliminating of required fees which will be proven 
unnecessary. Moreover, no concrete study is regularly conducted to partially, if not fully, 
account for the amount of government money loss to corruption. It is no wonder then that 
the gains from anti-corruption efforts are not available, if not totally unknown.    
 
 Historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus once said that “the more corrupt the state, the 
more laws” (Thinkexist.com, 2009). It also seems that its vice-versa holds true; that the 
more rules exist in any country or agency, the more opportunities for corruption-related 
activities are there. Philippine government, as a whole, is no exception. More and more 
government employees come up with different innovative ways to use and abuse their 
positions for personal gains. So far, the IDR had only looked into the management 
components of each participating government agencies in the area of procuring supplies 
and equipment, recruiting and promoting personnel, and the like. Ideally, IDR also covers 
the functional system, rules and procedures governing such areas but none of the 
recommendations target improvement and/or elimination of corruption-prone rules and 
regulations showing the limitations of IDR’s implementation as a diagnostic tool.   
 
 
 
5. Promoting improvement of anti-corruption systems 
 
 
In case there is a corruption issue uncovered in any government agency, ACRC 
acts as watchdog of the citizens. Specifically, “the ACRC seeks institutional 
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improvement projects by constantly monitoring press releases, audit reports, reported 
cases and corruption statistics, as well as conducting basic research.” (Anti-Corruption 
and Civil Rights Commission, 2009, p.29) It also informs the agency at fault so that it can 
take appropriate actions. Through this mechanism, the agency passes on the 
responsibility of addressing corruption to the agency that is directly affected by it. 
 
 Again, this can be incorporated to the OMB’s on-going IDR program. OMB has 
the legal mandates “to direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or 
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, as 
well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to 
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any 
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties”(par, 2, Section 15 of RA 6770 in 
relation to par. 2, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution).  
 
 In light of this, each participating government agency should come up with its 
own anti-corruption strategies guided by the results of the IDR conducted by OMB. Such 
anti-corruption plan and appropriate monitoring strategy should be reviewed of the 
concerned OMB authorities. Recently, anti-corruption efforts had been focused on Anti-
Fixer campaign in various government agencies such as Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
National Statistics Office, Land Transportation Office, Land Transportation Franchising 
Regulatory Board, and the like. In cooperation of other anti-corruption agencies such as 
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, Civil Service Commission, Anti-Money Laundering 
Council, Commission on Audit, and the Department of Foreign Affairs - Revenue 
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Integrity Protection Service, the OMB had posted Anti-Fixer posters in each of these 
agencies nationwide and the Anti-Fixer Hotline was set up. However, random visits to 
these agencies, specifically, their Metro Manila branches/offices, would reveal that many 
by-standers, who are obviously fixers by their appearances and dialogues, still exist in 
spite of such campaign. This only reveals the fact that without proper monitoring, not to 
mention the lack of any deterrent action, the anti-corruption strategies such as the Anti-
Fixer campaign are, ultimately, ineffective.   
 
 To address this, the OMB must make efficient use of its Bureau of Resident 
Ombudsman (BRO) personnel by giving them the duties and responsibilities to review 
the anti-corruption strategies of government agencies assigned to them as well as monitor 
and evaluate their implementation. The BRO is a department under the OMB – Public 
Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) comprised of lawyers called 
Resident Ombudsmen that are assigned to different government agencies. As the name 
implies, the Resident Ombudsmen perform the duties and functions of the Ombudsman in 
their assigned agencies. These duties must be performed with the cooperation of the 
authorities/representatives from the subject agencies and clients from the public and 
private sectors. Through involving the subject agencies and civil society, just like the 
ACRC, the OMB will be able to convey the important message that curbing corruption 
must be a shared responsibility for a graft-free society to be attainable.   
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6. Operating corruption reporting system 
 
 
ACRC categorizes all the complaints that it receives into two types: corruption 
reports and general complaints. Information regarding any corrupt behavior committed 
by government employees and officials are reported as corruption reports. These are then 
handed over to the Division of Deliberation or the Division of Code of Conduct for their 
initial assessment. Meanwhile, general complaints are usually in the forms of ordinary 
civil complaints that are handled by the Corruption Review Center. (Anti-Corruption and 
Civil Rights Commission, 2009, p.32)   
 
  This system is similar to the existing OMB-LSC and Anti-Fixer Hotlines. In 
reality, the hotline entertains any kind of complaints. Each day, an investigator from the 
OMB-Field Investigation Office (FIO) is assigned as the hotline agent. He/she records in 
the database reports, via text message and phone calls, on corrupt behavior of certain 
government officials/employees. At the end of each day, he/she must submit Call 
Information Sheet (CIS) which contains his/her recommendations regarding the 
complaints received. Recommendations are subject for approval of the team leaders. 
While the existence of the hotline is timely and practical for any complainants, it is, 
however, not devoid of problems. First, the amount of complaints via text messages that 
the hotline agent averages from 10 to 25, it is overwhelming since usually, it takes an 
exchange of several text messages before any corruption reports can be fully accounted 
for. Second, in addition to dealing with text messages, the hotline agent is also 
responsible for answering phone calls from complainants. This is not a problem for the 
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agent since, for a day, there are only 5 callers at the most. But this, and dealing with 
texters, can be overwhelming for one hotline agent. It only makes sense to add one more 
hotline agent each day to efficiently deal with texters and phone callers. Moreover, it will 
also be more efficient if two hotline agents will be permanently assigned. The OMB can 
hire new personnel that will manage the hotline or assign existing personnel from FIO 
given that they will not be given cases to investigate. This will address the inconvenience 
that complainant and agent both experience in case of follow-up calls or text messages. 
The number of personnel in the hotline is not fixed, the OMB may assign more, if it sees 
fit. The OMB can also consider allowing complainants to send complaints via the 
Office’s e-mail account or equipping its website a real-time messenger.  
 
  So far, the existence of the hotline had not been evaluated. It is then relevant that 
an evaluation be conducted by the OMB- Research and Special Studies Bureau (RSSB) 
to be able to determine if the hotline is an effective anti-corruption tool for the Office. An 
evaluation is also necessary to assess its strengths and weaknesses and to find out any 
improvement areas. Such task is in line with the bureau’s central mandate that is, to 
conduct relevant studies on various laws with the aim of improving them for greater 
efficiency of delivering government services to the public (Asian Ombudsman 
Association, n.d.[b]).  
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7. Protecting and rewarding whistleblowers 
 
 
 Recent stories of known whistleblowers such as Sandra Cam2, Boy Mayor3, and 
Rodolfo Lozada like provide dismal picture of the anti-corruption efforts in the country.  
Their stories signal the slow progress that the Philippines have been making in passing a 
functional whistleblowing act. The importance of whistle blowing act as an anti-
corruption tool is widely established in countries like Australia, Canada, France, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States (Latimer and 
Brown, n.d.) and South Korea (Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption, 
2003). In the Philippines, however, the act was drafted and submitted only in 2007 and 
still pending action by the Senate as of this date. Hence, often enough, whistleblower like 
Rodolfo Lozada, who exposed the involvement of President Arroyo’s husband in an 
anomalous contract with a foreign company in 2008, has to rely on religious groups 
composed of priests and nuns for protection.  
 
Meanwhile, the OMB has already signed the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) after ratifications were made in 2006 by the Philippine Senate. 
Article 33 of the UNCAC, in a nutshell, provides for the adoption of an established 
protection in favor of any individual and/or party who will expose any corruptive 
behavior (Public Concern at Work, undated). Ideally, the act signals the unfailing 
                                                            
2 Sandra Cam is one of the whistleblowers who revealed the involvement of the President Arroyo’s husband, First 
Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo in collecting illegal proceeds from jueteng (a form of lottery). After testifying, 
Sandra Cam was charged for libel. In 2006, she sought employment in Dubai but had returned to the country after 
one year (tsikot.yehey.com, 2008).  
3 Boy Mayor whose real name is Wilfredo Mayor was ambushed sometime in February 2010 (Salaveria, 2010). 
Along with Sandra Cam, he was one of the whistleblowers who exposed the involvement of First Gentleman Arroyo 
in getting jueteng kickbacks.  
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commitment of OMB to continue and improve its efforts to prevent and criminalize 
corrupt-related behaviors of government officials by actively pursuing the adoption of a 
Whistleblowing Act. However, OMB cannot find a parallel commitment in the country’s 
legislative body. As it is, the bill is still pending action of the Philippine Congress. 
Without such institutionalized law, reporting corruption will be considered more like a 
taboo and possible witnesses and complainants cannot rely on a secured social safety net 
in the country. More likely than not, they will choose to remain silent as it is more 
efficient for them.  
 
In a study conducted by Enriquez-Geron (n.d., slide 19), she identified several 
explanatory barriers to whistleblowing law such as culture of “pakikisama” or 
camaraderie, culture of “utang na loob” (a sense of obligation or a feeling of indebtedness 
to others), culture which rewards the corrupt and punishes the upright, expectation that 
the government will not take effective action (public institutions that lack credibility), 
and media sensationalizes whistleblowing cases.  
 
But the ratification of the UNCAC by the Philippine Senate should provide a 
spark of hope. In the absence of a whistleblowing act in the country, there are other 
remedies that the OMB can utilize.  These remedies include involving the civil society to 
participate in its successful legislation by lobbying. It is also important that in the OMB 
annual report, such should be included as one of the recommendations. In the report, the 
actors and their participation, its coverage and limitations, and provision of rewards 
should be very clear.   
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In addition, concerned OMB authorities must be involved in aggressive call for 
the adoption of the whistleblowing legislation. They can make use of different venues to 
send this important message. One possible forum is during the annual budget hearing. 
 
Another remedy is for the OMB to strictly monitor its confidentiality and no-
contact policies. Confidentiality refers to the extent by which and to whom OMB 
employees can disclose any information involving corruption reports filed before the 
office. “No contact policy” refers to the limitation of any OMB employees, especially 
field investigators, to make any contact with the subjects and/or respondents of the cases 
that they handle. Clear messages on the strict implementation of these policies can be 
made through regular social values formation seminars. Such is helpful in maintaining 
the confidentiality of each complaint handled by OMB investigators and lawyers and 
thereby, protecting whistleblowers or complainants.  
 
Until 2008, Ehem!Aha! program was part and parcel of the OMB’s Education and 
Anti-Corruption Promotion. It is a regular training conducted for the public officials and 
employees from different government offices pursuant to the Memorandum between the 
Philippine Province of the Society of Jesus (PPSJ) and the Office of the Ombudsman 
(Office of the Ombudsman, 2008b, par. 1). For the employees of the OMB, it is 
mandatory to attend this seminar. It is part and parcel of the OMB’s strategy to create 
awareness on the importance of cultivating a culture of integrity and accountability in the 
public sector. In a similar vein, the Public Accountability Seminar is also conducted in 
cooperation with selected public servants (Office of the Ombudsman, 2008b). Given this, 
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the OMB must consider offering such seminar training programs again or initiating a 
different program with similar orientation and objectives.   
 
8. Enforcing the code of conduct for public organization employees 
 
 
Another important activity of ACRC under its customized integrity consulting is 
monitoring the strict adherence of government employees and official to the codes of 
conduct of their own agencies. The main features of the code of conduct that ACRC 
monitors includes “reporting external lectures and conferences, prohibiting private use of 
position, avoiding the duties related to personal interests, limiting the acts of giving and 
receiving money and gifts, prohibiting borrowing money and others”( Anti-Corruption 
and Civil Rights Commission, 2009, pp.40-41). Other key components involve any 
“process regarding an order that hampers a fair performance of duties, the exclusion of 
privileges, the prohibition of the use of budget other than its own purposes, the measures 
against unfair requests made by politicians and others, the prohibition of solicitations 
regarding employment or nomination, the prohibition of influence peddling, the 
prohibition of interference with rights and solicitation, the limitation on transactions 
using information related to duties, the prohibition of using public property for private 
use and benefiting, etc”( Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2009, p.41).   
  
  The Philippines has similar institutionalized legal provisions as embodied in 
Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards 
for Public Officials and Employees (Office of the Ombudsman, 2004) and Presidential 
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Decree No. 46 which  penalizes public officials and employees who receive, and private 
persons who give gifts on all occasions, even Christmas. But then again, no authority or 
body monitors whether or not public employees and officials follow and adhere to such 
provisions.  
 
  The OMB must seek the active participation of the other government agencies, 
through different seminars and re-convening previous linkages with other anti-corruption 
agencies, in adopting an orientation program for every new recruits in the public service. 
Through such orientation program, new recruits will be introduced to the expectations, 
realities, and ideal code of conduct expected from them as public servants.  
 
 
9. Integrity education, PR and international cooperation 
 
With the aim of cultivating a culture of integrity not only in the public sectors but 
also among students and private sectors, ACRC conducts Expert Training Courses on 
Integrity” as well as the “Online Education Course on Integrity”. ACRC also makes 
promotional videos on integrity for public officials and endeavors to incorporate a course 
on education curriculum in public education in order to develop and foster integrity 
among students. In addition, ACRC launched the National Literary Contest and a national 
essay competition involving students from middle and high schools with integrity as the 
main theme (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2009).     
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  In 2008, the ACRC launched various activities such as the “Clean Korea 
Campaign” and conducted different PR activities. ACRC is also involved in media 
promotions in its efforts to create popular consciousness and encourage participation 
from the public in fighting corruption. ACRC sponsored narrative stories on integrity that 
were shown on national television and broadcasted over radio nationwide. The 
commission also holds integrity education for public officials, students, general citizens 
and continuously promotes international cooperation to fight corruption.  ACRC also 
conducts activities promoting collaboration between public and private sectors and 
building international linkages (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2009, 
pp.42-46).  
 
  At the outset, the OMB has a lot of things going on under this strategy (Asian 
Ombudsman Association, n.d.[b]). Yearly, it publishes its Annual Report as well as its 
journal publication online as part of its public awareness and outreach. It also started 
distributing Graft and Corruption Prevention Education Teaching Exemplars which is a 
set of teaching guides for all elementary and secondary teachers in public schools 
nationwide (par. 35). Its dissemination is a part of the OMB’s efforts to inculcate among 
students a culture of truthfulness and uprightness and teach them the real essence of 
doing public service. The OMB also gives public accountability seminars to members of 
barangay council on a regular basis in order to evaluate their own performance vis-à-vis 
the existing Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees 
otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6713. The seminars also include introducing them 
to various functional anti-corruption rules and regulations. The OMB also makes efficient 
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use of the available media (radio, TV, newspapers) to keep the public updated about its 
relevant anti-corruption campaign programs.  
  
  However, a closer scrutiny as provided by the TAN (Human Development 
Network, 2009) reveals that the current OMB administration falls short of coordinating 
its anti-corruption efforts with other anti-corruption bodies and civil society groups. In an 
insider interview by HDN-TAN (2009), it was revealed that the incumbent OMB 
maintains strained relationships with various civil society groups ultimately causing them 
to withdraw their supports to the OMB’s efforts. TAN was one of the skeptical civil 
organizations from which the OMB had chosen to distance itself.  
   
  In his undated work, Obejas concluded that equally important as the active 
combat against graft and corruption is the initiative for a moral revolution. It is 
incumbent then to the OMB, being the country’s top graft-buster to take concrete actions 
to realize this wisdom. Cultivating integrity within the public sector, youth, and private 
groups and business club is one of the ways this can be achieved. Working along with the 
most vocal and critical civil society groups is especially helpful in this regard. Instead of 
considering them as enemies, it will do the OMB a lot of good more than harm, if it will 
make them partners in its crusade against corruption. The OMB should consider having 
regular meetings and consultation with them. Corruption is a very complex problem and 
involved a lot of actors from public and private actors. The OMB can enlist the help and 
support of these groups to make up for its lack in manpower to deal with such 
complicated problem.  
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10. Comprehensive management of anti-corruption information  
 
 
 The integration of the Ombudsman of Korea, the AAC, and the KICAC into one 
single anti-corruption body also gave way to the creation of a single portal system called 
e-people designed for more efficient handling of complaints and other administrative 
concerns from the public. e-People is a sophisticated online system integrating all 
communication channels of the administrative organizations and the people through 
which petition, proposal and policy discussion services are taken care of at the same time 
(Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission,n.d.[a]). 
 
 Through such system, a person need only submit a complaint, inquiry or any 
policy issues online and he/she can receive real-time replies to her/his concerns from the 
concerned agency. This is made possible by its automatic classification scheme. Once the 
system had classified the complaint or issue, it will forward such to the closest concerned 
agency for appropriate action. Results of a recent study tour made by selected officials 
from the Office of the Ombudsman – Hongkong also made them considered reviewing its 
feasibility and applicability to their own system (Office of the Ombudsman, Hongkong, 
2009).  
 
 Notably, Korea is way more technologically-advanced society than the 
Philippines. This perhaps accounts for the successful integration of e-governance in the 
country. But such must not serve as a weakness of the Philippine government; instead, it 
must be treated as an opportunity to exhaust various technological means that could aid 
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better governance. One way of doing so is to study the feasibility of having an interactive 
complaint online system whereby, people will be able to submit complaint and receive 
updated replies regarding their concerns. In this way, people would be able to act 
proactively against governance lapses and acts of corruption. Securing that the voice of 
the public is heard and acted immediately upon is one effective way to encourage their 
participation and boosting their faith to anti-corruption agencies such as the OMB. 
 
 Another area of improvement lies in expediting the resolution of cases and 
complaints filed before the OMB. Say, for instance, in the area of fact-finding and case 
build-up, the FIO has to issue subpoenae to relevant agencies regarding the complaints 
particularly, Lifestyle Check cases, which it handles. Each government agency, should 
under penalty of the law, comply within five days from receipt thereof. Regularly, FIO 
issued subpoena duces tecum (SDT) to agencies such as the Land Transportation Office 
(LTO), Civil Service Commission (CSC), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Bureau of 
Immigration, Municipal Government Offices, and other government departments and 
bureaus. The process of verifying the identities, properties, and employment of the 
subjects of the investigation could be expedited if the OMB can secure access to the 
databases of these agencies upon request. Access should be limited to OMB personnel 
with investigative duties and necessary database securities should be implemented and 
trainings should be conducted to guarantee the confidentiality of all database information. 
This is possible with the unreserved support from different government agencies to the 
mandates of the OMB. There are avenues to secure such support. One of this is the 
established linkage of the OMB with other anti-corruption bodies and government 
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departments. Until 2005, OMB was the active leader of the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft 
Coordinating Council which ties the Ombudsman, Commission on Audit (COA) and 
Civil Service Commission (CSC) for a more solid anti-corruption effort (Human 
Development Network, 2009. Through this council, the OMB has significant links with 
other anti-corruption agencies of the country, academic world and civil society (Office of 
the Ombudsman, 2008b). However, the OMB failed to meet up with members hence; the 
result is duplication of anti-corruption strategies such as the OMB. Priorities were given 
to activities such as Oplan Red Plate, which is a duplication of work of the Civil Service 
Commission (CSC) (TAN, 2009), and the creation of task forces on issues human 
trafficking and smuggling which is also being addressed by other investigative agencies.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
  
 
 By and large, this study shows that no country is exempted from corruption. Its degree 
and impact however varies. The solution to such problem also differs from one country to 
another. In the Philippines, corruption hurts the poor the most thus, widening the gap between 
them and the rich even more.  It also undermines the capacity of the country to develop its full 
potential as an economy. Similar tale exists in Korea, a developed country no less. It also 
struggles in its own form of corruption. This study explores how ACRC of Korea addresses the 
problem and concludes that the OMB stands to benefits in most of its anti-corruption strategies. 
Although there are inherent differences between the two institutions, most notable of which, is in 
terms of their focus. The focus of ACRC is on corruption prevention although, it does 
investigative activities. The OMB, on the one hand, is mandated to conduct corruption 
prevention, investigation, and prosecution. The OMB has much to learn in terms of preventing 
corruption from the ACRC anti-corruption strategies.  
 
 
 The study reveals three major strengths of ACRC anti-corruption strategies. Firstly, it is 
focused in helping government agencies deal with the problems of corruption in their 
organizations. Secondly, it engages the civil society in actively participating in its anti-corruption 
campaign. Lastly, it takes advantage of the available technology in enhancing its capacity to 
effectively address the problem. In a nutshell, the researcher concludes that the ACRC had 
addressed what were considered important in formulating and implementing anti-corruption 
policies; reduction of inducement for committing corrupt acts, reduction of likelihood of 
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committing corruption, and installing an anti-corruption system that will make corruption as a 
high-risk, low reward activity (B. Kim, n.d.). ACRC does this by the reduction of government 
size and regulation as manifested by the different corruption assessment reviews of government 
rules and regulations that they conduct. Moreover, ACRC’s system provides for easy detection 
of corruption behavior of government officials and employees. Through its interactive website 
and provision of one-stop services, ACRC is able to demonstrate that its openness and 
responsiveness in acting on corruption complaints. Most importantly, it has established a 
functional whistleblowing protection system which contributes to its effectiveness in 
encouraging people to report errant behavior of government officials.  
 
 As P. Kim (n.d.), had put it, “strong political will is crucial” in any anti-corruption 
agency and in promoting anti-corruption reforms (p.26). In the Philippines, as Quah (2006) had 
pointed out, as in China, India, Indonesia, and Mongolia, fighting corruption in the Philippines is 
almost made futile with lack of political will and inadequate anti-corruption measures. In Korea, 
there is a different story. Among others, ACRC’s anti-corruption system is a manifestation of 
Korean government’s strong political will to strengthen its fight against corruption. Though 
lacking in other powers that Philippines’ OMB has, it is able to impose concrete prevention and 
deterrence measures. In these areas, the OMB has much to learn. It must rethink and must 
aggressively exercise its influence and power in improving its anti-corruption mechanism. It can 
start from advocating for the adoption of the proposed whistleblowing bill, actively engaging 
different civic groups in its anti-corruption campaigns, and demonstrating strong political will in 
combating corruption. It is also important that OMB must identify the priority areas in its fight 
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against corruption. Unless these points are given serious consideration, corruption is and will 
always get in the way of getting things done for the Philippines. 
 
 For future studies, the researcher recommends that the limitations of this study be 
addressed. As there are many lessons in Korea’s corruption prevention, which is the primary 
focus of ACRC, it is equally interesting to explore what lessons are there for the Philippine 
Ombudsman in the area of investigation and prosecution.  
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APPENDIX A 
ACRC and Its Organization Structure 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairman 
Secretary General/ 
Vice Chairman 
Vice 
Chairman 
Vice Chairman 
Standing 
Commissioners (3)
Non-Standing 
Commissioners 
Management 
Support 
Division 
 
• Planning and 
Budget Division 
• Administrative 
Management 
Division 
• Legal & Audit 
Division 
• Informatization 
Division 
• Institutional 
Improvement 
Planning Division 
• Institutional 
Improvement 
Division 
• International 
Relations Division 
• Counseling 
Division 
• 110 Government 
Call Center 
• e-People Division 
• Complaints 
Information 
Analysis Center  
• NGO & Business 
Cooperation 
Division  
 
 
• Complaints 
Investigation 
Planning Division  
• Administrative, 
Culture, and 
Education 
Complaints Division
• National Defense, 
Patriots, & Veterans  
Complaints Division
• Police Complaints 
Division 
• Welfare and Labor 
Complaints Division
• Treasury & Taxation 
Complaints Division 
• Industry, Agro-
Forestry & 
Environment 
Complaints Division
• Housing & 
Construction 
Complaints Division
• Urban & Water 
Resources 
Complaints  
• Traffic & Road 
Division  
 
• General 
Administrative 
Appeals Division 
• Anti-Corruption 
Survey& 
Evaluation 
Division  
• Anti-Corruption 
Education 
Division 
• Corruption Impact 
Assessment 
Division 
• Inspection 
Planning 
Division 
• Inspection 
Division 
• Code of Conduct 
Division 
• Protection & 
Reward Division 
 
 
• General 
Administrative 
Appeals Division  
• Administration & 
Education Appeals 
Division  
• Treasury & 
Economic Appeals 
Division 
• Land & Marine 
Appeals Division 
• Social Welfare 
Appeals Division 
• Environment & 
Culture Appeals 
Division  
Planning & 
Coordination 
Ombudsman 
Bureau
Anti-Corruption 
Bureau 
Administrative 
Appeals Bureau 
Source: Anti-Corruption and 
Civil Rights Commission 
(n.d.[b]) About Us. 
Organization. Retrived from 
www.acrc.go.kr.eng/index.do. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Status Reports Transferred to Investigative Authorities Annually 
(Source: ACRC Korea, 2009, p.33) 
 
 
  Transfer to Investigative Authorities 
Classification Total Notice of Investigation Results  Under 
Investigation 
Corruption 
Detection 
Rate (%) 
  Sub-total Disclosed 
Corruption
No Charge
Total 562 509 359 150 53 70.5 
2002 74 74 47 27 - 63.5 
2003 100 100 67 33 - 67.0 
2004 66 66 48 18 - 72.7 
2005 82 82 53 29 - 64.6 
2006 83 82 63 19 1 76.8  
2007 92 85 66 19 7 77.6 
2008 65 20 15 5 45 75.0 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Measures Taken against Referred Cases  
(Source: ACRC Korea, 2009, p.33) 
 
 
 Prosecution 
(person) 
Disciplinary 
Action 
(person) 
Warning/ 
Notification
(person) 
Institutional
Warning 
(case) 
Others  
(person) 
Total Money  
Recovered
(million 
KRW) 
Total 738 245 541 90 45 1,659 74,348 
2002 54 43 110 14 3 224 8,026 
2003 89 26 93 35 15 258 40,460 
2004 62 14 92 9 0 177 1,859 
2005 103 45 30 5 13 196 1,195 
2006 147 23 133 4 5 312 9,713 
2007 233 94 74 14 6 421 11,160 
2008 50 0 9 9 3 71 1,935 
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APPENDIX D 
The OMB and Its Organizational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the Ombudsman. (2008a). Organizational Structures. Retrieved from 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph.  
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